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Abstract
Fern is an updatable cryptographically authenticated dictionary developed to propagate identification and
authorization information within distributed systems. While conventional authenticated dictionaries permit
authorization information to be disseminated by untrusted proxies, these proxies must maintain full duplicates of the dictionary structure. In contrast, Fern incrementally distributes components of its dictionary
as required to satisfy client requests and thus is suitable for deployments where clients are likely to require
only a small fraction of a dictionary’s contents and connectivity may be limited
When dictionary components must be obtained remotely, the latency of lookup and validation operations
is dominated by communication time. This latency can be reduced through the exploitation of localitysensitive caching of dictionary components. Fern dictionary’s components are suitable for caching and
distribution via autonomic scalable locality-aware Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) and therefore can
provide these properties without requiring the provisioning of a dedicated distribution infrastructure.
Since search operations on trees are necessarily serialized, communication latency in distributed systems
can be tens to thousands of milliseconds, and bandwidth can be limited, the constants matter. Others have
recently proposed the construction of incrementally distributed authenticated dictionaries embedded into
search structures of logarithmic depth. However, these alternatives require either the sequential transfer of
two-to-three times more vertices or the replacement of a greater number of already distributed vertices when
updates occur.
A prototype implementation of Fern has been constructed that utilizes the CoralCDN scalable, localityaware, and autonomic content distribution network. We provide an analysis of bandwidth requirements
for the Fern authenticated dictionary that corresponds with experimental results. We are not aware of
other implemented systems with similar properties or comparable analysis of such systems’ performance and
bandwidth requirements.

1

Introduction

Reliable and consistent dissemination and revocation of access permissions and identity mappings are persistent problems in distributed systems. Consistent dissemination of trust and authorization information
include online validation services such as OCSP[15] and the dissemination of time-limited public-key based
certificates[15, 4, 18, 11]. These approaches share a high computational cost for public-key cryptography.
They also reflect a range of scalability, timeliness, and connectivity characteristics. On one extreme, on-line
status verification protocols provide per-transaction validation of access permissions when sufficient computational and communication bandwidth to trusted online servers can be assured. Credentials with extended
lifetimes reduce the bandwidth and computational power required to convey information needed for autho-

rization decisions by effectively relaxing consistency. However, a window of TOCTTOU1 vulnerability is
created if no mechanism is incorporated to disseminate and respond to premature revocation.
Updatable online authenticated dictionaries[19, 10, 9, 2] have recently been proposed as complementary
source of authorization information based upon integrity-guaranteed name-to-value mappings stored within
indexed or searchable data structures. These mappings may be used to provide evidence of authorization
or revocation2 . Composed cryptographic hashes are embedded within these dictionaries in a manner that
permits their distribution via untrusted proxies to security-sensitive clients who can efficiently validate
mappings (or the lack of mappings) stored within them.
A feature of authenticated dictionaries containing such composed hashes is that the integrity of the entire
structure can be witnessed by a single public-key root certificate. This property can be exploited by proxies
and security-sensitive clients that incrementally obtain and validate portions of their search structure as
required to answer queries. Furthermore, these partial copies of the dictionary’s structure can be cached and
therefore utilized to answer future queries that share common components.
Modifications to mappings stored within an authenticated dictionary typically cause changes to the dictionary’s search structures. Since components of an authenticated dictionary may be cached, it is desirable
if these updates are localized. Thus, algorithms that rely on structural modification to achieve good performance (e.g. self-balancing trees) can be problematic.
Fern utilizes a randomized prefix-trie that has expected O(log n) complexity for all update, lookup,
and validation operations. This complexity is asymptotically equivalent to other authenticated dictionaries.
However, we argue that, given the high latency of inter-host communication in distributed systems, the
constants do matter and Fern’s expected cost is comparable to the most aggressive algorithms based upon
self-balancing trees and far lower than skip-lists. Furthermore, Fern’s algorithm is far simpler than selfbalancing trees and does not require rotation.
While others have proposed designs for authenticated dictionaries whose contents are distributed via
an autonomic content distribution network (CDN), we are unaware of any other implemented systems. We
present measurements collected from our prototype implementation that utilize the CoralCDN self-organizing
and locality-aware content distribution network.
Finally, we believe that we are the first to consider the impact of cacheability upon the cost of monitoring
a set of mappings stored within an authenticated dictionary that exploits caching. In Section 4.1, we provide
an informal analysis that agrees with observed behavior.

2

Related Work

On-line authenticated dictionaries disseminate the contents of a database containing name:value mappings
to network-connected clients. The originator of an authenticated dictionary embeds a set of immutable
name:value mappings within a search structure3 . Like other authenticated dictionaries, Fern exploits the
structural composition of cryptographic hashes (see Merkle[14]) to amortize the cost of a single public-key
crytpographic operation that serves as a witness to the entire dictionary’s integrity. This facilitates the
scalable distribution of these mappings by untrusted publishers whose clients request and validate copies of
mappings stored in these dictionaries by querying any publisher claiming to have a current copy.
Due to their ability to scale to thousands of hosts and respond to dynamic changes in connectivity,
we are particularly interested in authenticated dictionary structures that are suitable for dissemination by
peer-to-peer content distribution networks. Our prototype of Fern utilizes the CoralCDN[5] locality-aware
content-distribution network.
It is desirable for authenticated dictionaries to be structured in a manner that permits (1) publishers
to determine the integrity of nodes they distribute and (2) clients to determine the validity of name:value
mappings without requiring transfer and/or storage of the entire dictionary structure.
1 Time-of-check-to-time-of-use

(see [7])
that the person known to the dictionary’s originator as “Alice” is associated with public key KA , or that certificate
number N has been revoked.
3 Fern can also implement a common variant of authenticated dictionary used to communicate certificate revocation lists
that disseminates sets of names (e.g. certificate serial numbers) with empty values. Their function is analogous to the word
lists frequently used to arbitrate disputes in the popular parlor game Scrabble.
2 E.g.
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Fern’s key-to-value mappings are stored within a search-DAG (directed acyclic graph). Following the
model of Merkle’s practical digital signature system[14] each vertex of this DAG (including its root) contains
a cryptographic hash of its immediate children, and can transitively witness the integrity of all descendents.
Thus, path consisting of vertices from such a DAG’s root to a vertex containing the referenced mapping
serves as a Validation Object (VO)[12] that witnesses the mapping’s integrity. The number of nodes in a VO
is bounded by the DAG’s depth, which is typically logarithmic in the number of mappings stored within the
dictionary.
While cryptographic hashes can be used to demonstrate that (portions of) a previously composed data
structure has not been corrupted, other mechanisms are typically used to disseminate identifiers for and
hashes of updated structures. The identifier permits the dictionary’s originator to specify the root of a
dictionary structure, and the cryptographic hash provides a witness to the dictionary’s integrity. Fern
conjoins search-structure identifers and their hashes into a single node identifier (NID) and the root’s NID
is embedded within a root certificate that both references and authenticates the current root of a Fern
dictionary. Like other authenticated dictionaries, the integrity of a Fern root certificate is witnessed by a
digital signature generated using asymmetric cryptography.
The typical application of an online authenticated dictionary has a single (exclusive) writer and multiple
(concurrent) clients and thus has semantics analogous to the CREW (concurrent-read exclusive-write) shared
memory storage model. However, due to an authenticated dictionary’s pervasive use of hash composition,
it is not sufficient to modify a name:value mapping in place. As a result, authenticated dictionaries are
typically immutable and thus provide semantics similar to WORM (write-once, read-many) storage devices.
Analogously to hardware WORM devices (e.g. PROM, CD-R), the distribution of updates to dats stored
within these structures can be complex or expensive. Originators of such structures typically distribute
(1) full replacement dictionaries and/or (2) a continuous stream of updates that must be applied to the
previously distributed full dictionary. The first approach can require the periodic dissemination of a large
data structure that can be problematic for bandwidth-limited deployments. The second approach requires
that publishers obtain all updates since the current dictionary was published and the transmission of all
missed updates after a prolonged disconnection can be be expensive. Furthermore, this full-replication
approach will distribute portions of the dictionary that may not be referenced by a particular publisher’s
clients.
In contrast, Fern achieves CREW semantics by permitting originators to distribute in-place updates
by replacing and distributing . on demand only those vertices whose contents have changed. Since vertex
contents include cryptographic hashes whose value is dependent on their descendants, each updated mapping
will typically result in the replacement and dissemination of all O(log2 n) vertices on the path between the
root certificate and the vertex containing the mutated mapping.
Since the transfer of a single vertex to a client can have a latency of tens to thousands of milliseconds,
it is important to minimize the number of transfers. Related techniques have been recently explored by
Goodrich, Tamassia, et al.[10, 8, 19]. These approaches utilize either skiplists or self-balancing search trees
of logarithmic depth. However, skiplists require that clients transfer two-to-three times more vertices than
Fern’s trie. Self-balancing search tress have similar depth, but rebalancing operations require complicated
algorithms and the structural changes required to maintain balance reduces the utility of caches, and thus
can result in the replacement and transfer of more tree vertices.

3

Approach

A Fern dictionary’s internal structure is a binary Merkle-trie with path compression. Like the similarly
authenticated authorization framework suggested by Tamassia et. al. in [19], vertices from Fern’s Merkle-trie
are suitable for distribution by peer-to-peer (P2P) Content Distribution Networks (CDNs) to clients who
construct and maintain VOs for mappings on which they depend.
As illustrated in Figure 1, Fern’s trie is a binary prefix tree whose internal vertices with no branching are
eliminated. Name:value mappings are stored in leaf vertices whose search key is equal to the name’s SHA-1
hash. Following the model of a Merkle-tree[14], internal nodes also contain SHA-1 hashes of each immediate
descendant (these hashes are not indicated in this figure). The incorporation of these hashes permits clients
who possess valid copies of internal vertices to validate the integrity of their descendants’. The current root
3

and its hash is stored in a root certificate signed with the originator’s public key using GPG’s DSA cipher.
By creating a Fern dictionary, an originator serves as a Certification Authority for clients who depend
on mappings stored within it. A Fern verification object (VO) for a particular name corresponds to a search
path containing its mapping. If the name is stored within the trie, it will terminate in a leaf containing its
mapping. Otherwise, it will contain a search path that demonstrates that the referenced name is not in the
trie.
Our initial implementation of Fern publishes through the CoralCDN self-organizing and locality-aware
content distribution network. Coral serves as a scalable autonomic proxy-cache for frequently-referenced
vertices. Clients obtain vertices required to construct or update VOs from coral and thus avoid transferring
the entire trie structure. This helps to minimize network congestion that arises from distributing vertices.
Furthermore, client caching is exploited, thus eliminating the need to obtain the same vertex multiple times.
prefix
length

Root cert
(public key)
Parents certify children:
Node names contain hash
of contents

0

0*
0

1

1*

2

00*

01*

111

3

4

0010
Eric:t

0101
Dave:f

1110
Chris:t

1111
Bob:f

Figure 1: A Fern trie for 4-bit keys containing leaves (0010, 0101, 1110, and 1111). The leaves contain
mappings of names to groups. Internal nodes are labeled by their corresponding key prefix and edges denote
the bits that they match.

3.1

Authentication with Fern

Figure 1 depicts a simplified example of the structure of a Fern trie. In contrast to Fern, which uses 160-bit
SHA-1 hash digests as search keys, the simplified trie depicted in Figure 1 only uses four-bit search keys.
Name:value mappings are stored in leaf vertices with search-keys corresponding to the name’s hash digest.
In this figure, the name “Bob” (mapped to f ) is depicted as having a hash equal to 1111.
Routing decisions within this trie are made one bit at a time, in decreasing order of significance. Each
internal vertex is labeled with the search prefix corresponding to the common prefix shared by all its descendants. Vertices within tries that have no branching are collapsed as is illustrated by the absence of vertices
corresponding to the prefixes 1, 10, 11, and 110.
A client with interest in an Id’s mapping stored within Fern obtains the set of trie nodes that comprise
the path from the root to the desired leaf. Monte Carlo experimenets indicate that leaves within Fern’s trie
are generally at a depth of 1.1 log2 n where n is the number of mappings stored within the trie.
A leaf vertex with search key k stores a name:value mapping where k is the name’s SHA-1 cryptographic
hash. Each internal vertex of a Fern authorization trie contains node identifiers (NIDs) of its children. NIDs
are used as a locator by clients requesting particular nodes. Like SFS-RO’s[6] self-certifying pathnames,
Fern’s NIDs include cryptographic hashes of the referenced node’s contents and are used to verify the
integrity of a nodes obtained from insecure channels.
4

As illustrated at the top of Figure 1, the Fern CA periodically publishes a signed, time-limited root
certificate using asymmetric cryptography. Fern clients know the CA’s asymmetric public-key identity and
use it to determine the integrity of root certificates. Every internal node of a Fern trie contains NIDs of its
immediate descendants, and NIDs contain cryptographic hashes of the nodes they reference. Thus the full
path of trie nodes from a root certificate to a leaf node can be validated.
A VO for a referenced identifier, I, contains all Fern-nodes between the Fern-root and I. A full certification path can be included within the payload of a single message transmitted from one Fern client to
another. Alternatively, since each internal node of a Fern-trie contains both search guides and the NIDs of
immediate children, a Fern client can obtain a certification path for I by obtaining intermediate nodes as it
traverses the path from the root toward the leaf node containing I.
A search-path that comprises a complete VO can be transmitted directly between clients, or instead be
constructed by a client that recursively searches for the trie leaf containing the required name:value mapping.
prefix
length

Root cert
(public key)
Parents certify children:
Node names contain hash
of contents

0

0*
0

1

1*

2

00*

01*

010

3

4

0010
Eric:t

0100
Alice:t

111

0101
Dave:f

1110
Chris:t

1111
Bob:f

Figure 2: Inserting node 0100 requires inserting a new internal node 010 and updating all ancestor nodes
(shaded) along the path.

3.2

Trie Insertion

Figure 2 illustrates modifications the the trie of Figure 1 after the insertion of a mapping for “Alice” to
“t”. Observe that this insertion also required the creation of a new internal vertex corresponding to prefix
“010.” Since each internal vertex contains the cryptographic hash of its children, all of Alice’s ancestors will
be updated as is indicated by shading in this figure. Since a new NID will be used to identify each of these
updated vertices, they will be distributed by the CDN as replacement rather than as updated values.
Note that clients will be unaware of any updates until the next time a root certificate is issued that
references the replacement root. Our prototype implementation of Fern generates a new root certificate
every five minutes, and thus updates are grouped into five minute epochs.

3.3

Interactions Between Clients

Assume Bob and Alice are motivated to enter into a trust-sensitive relationship for which their Fern VOs
can serve as supporting evidence. It is likely to be most efficient for them to exchange their complete VOs
at the time the relationship is established.
Since this relationship may be prolonged, Alice will be motivated to monitor Bob’s authorization and
thus will need to update his VO every time the trie root is modified. Since a prolonged relationship may
5

extend beyond the current root certificate’s lifetime, additional vertices may be required to continue their
mutual authorization. Our implementation of Fern automatically obtains vertices needed to update VOs
representing such continuing relationships from the CDN and thus exploits the CDN’s ability to scalability
distribute online content in a locality-sensitive manner.

4

Comparison with Other Cacheable Authenticated Dictionaries

Several designs for authenticated dictionaries with equivalent asymptotic complexity have been proposed.
In this section, we examine their expected cost and argue that the constants matter because latency of
authenticated dictionary operations that rely on distributed caches to distribute vertices is heavily dependent
on the latency of necessarily serialized communication.
As discussed in Section 3.3, we observe that the determination and maintenance of authorization are
important operations for clients of authenticated dictionaries. In both cases, a client’s challenge is to repeatedly obtain and validate the subset of a dictionary’s current vertices needed to maintain VOs that authorize
relationships on which the client relies.
A VO for a particular mapping stored within an authenticated dictionary can be quickly generated if all
needed vertices are available from a nearby dictionary. However, if the dictionary is large, connectivity is
limited, or worse connectivity varies dynamically, it may be impractical to distribute the entire dictionary
to proxies with good connectivity to clients.
Fern uses an alternative approach of distributing a dictionary’s data structures incrementally through
the use of an autonomic content distribution infrastructure (such as a DHT). In such a deployments, each
successive vertex in a VO’s transitive chain must be obtained sequentially.
As observed by Tammasia and Triandopolos, the expected time to acquire a dictionary node stored within
a DHT composed of P hosts will require O(log P ) pairwise communications that must be serialized. Since
each pairwise communication can take dozens to hundreds of milliseconds, communication latency is likely
to dominate the time required to assemble a VO.
Since the computational cost related to construct and verify a VO is small, the time required by a client
to assumable or update a VO will be dependent on the the number of nodes that this client must obtain
from the content distribution infrastructure.
Tamassia, Goodrich, Winsboro, and others identified skiplists[17] and various self-balancing trees[16, 3] as
having the following desirable properties for the underlying data structures used for cacheable and updatable
authenticated dictionaries.
• Logarithmic expected leaf node depth with narrow variance. This ensures that the number of vertices
within a VO is logarithmic in the number of words stored within the dictionary
• Localization of tree update operations. Rotation and other tree-rebalancing operations disrupt the tree
structure and thus require replacement (and transmission) of tree vertices that might not otherwise be
affected by a particular tree update operation.
A Fern VO for a word stored at depth d contains d dictionary vertices. Monte Carlo experiments indicate
that, within a very narrow variance, the expected value for d is 1.1 log2 n for n > 213 . Furthermore, as
described in Section ??, update operations associated with a word stored within a leaf of a Fern trie are
localized to that leaf and its (approximately 1.1 log2 n) ancestors.
In [10], Goodrich, Tammasia, et al. identify skiplists as suitable structures for constructing authenticated
dictionaries in a distributed environment. While skiplists share Fern’s desirable property of not requiring
rebalancing, we observe that a client must collect a greater number of vertices when assembling a skiplistbased VO than a Fern VO: The expected number of skiplist vertices that must be examined when assembling
a VO from a dictionary containing n words is 3 log2 n, and the expected number of vertices within a skiplist
that will be modified when an entry is updated is 2 log2 n. As described in Section 4.1, Fern’s expected value
of 1.1 log2 n for the number of nodes to update compares very favorably with skiplists.
In [19], Tamassia and Triandopolos identify red-black and BB[α] as suitable dictionary structures for
constructing authenticated dictionaries whose vertices are, like Fern, distributed by an autonomic DHTbased cache. These self-balancing trees utilize rotations to guarantee that the search-structure remains
approximately balanced. While these rotations are infrequent, they will increase the number of vertices
6

that are replaced and thus increase network communication required to update VOs not associated with the
updated mapping.
The advantage that Fern’s Merkle-trie achieves over self-balancing trees and skip lists arises from the
ability of a good hash function (e.g. SHA-1) to evenly distribute a set of elements over an ordered range
which is large compared to the number of elements being distributed. Each data element is hashed to the
range 0 ... 2160 , where each value corresponds to a possible leaf of Fern’s Merkle-trie. The specific values to
which data elements are hashed become the actual leaves of Fern’s Merkle-trie. It is because of the nature
of the hashing function that the Merkle-trie is created in a well-balanced manner, without any dynamic
interventions. This, massive virtual hash table structure is usable because it allocates memory for nodes in
a lazy fashion. No node is allocated unless it is an actual leaf or if both of its children are either actual
leaves or ancestors of actual leaves. Thus, as is common in tries, some edges will be compressed and further
reduces the memory required for this trie, and reduces the number of vertices within a VO.

4.1

Expected number of refresh queries

The hash value of a Merkle-tries’s leaf and all of its ancestors changes whenever the leaf’s contents are
updated. In this section, we consider the number of vertices that must be obtained by a client who is
monitoring mappings stored within a set of w = |W | watched leaves within a dictionary storing a total of n
mappings in the event that u = |U | leaves are updated.
Let c = |U ∩ W | be the number of vertices in W whose mappings have changed.
Below, we informally demonstrate how the cases where w ≤ u and u ≤ w are reducible to each other.
Throughout both analyses, we will be making the approximation of a well balanced trie at all levels. Our
empirical studies[?] indicate taht this is a good approximation, especially as w, u and n become large. We
begin with an informal overview and then provide arguments that constrain the constants.

4.2

Case 1: w ≤ u

As illustrated in Figure 3, our analysis divides the trie into three regions. The upper region, which extends
to depth blog2 wc has approximately w vertices at its (approximate) lower edge. We assume that our hash
function has uniformly distributed keys, and thus assume that most of these (approximately) w vertices are
ancestors to the w leaves mapping members of W . Since u ≥ w, it is likely that most of these (approximately)
w vertices members are also ancestors of the members of |U |. Thus our client is likely to require updates for
all (approximately) 2w − 1 vertices in the upper region.
The middle region of this trie extends to depth blog2 uc. Like our analysis of the upper region, it is likely
that most vertices above depth log2 u contain nodes that are ancestors of the u updated leaves and thus most
vertices in this region are likely to have been updated. However, only w paths of length blog2 (u/w)c through
this middle region are likely to be ancestors of vertices being watched,and thus only wblog2 (u/w)c of these
vertices are likely to be needed by the client.
The lower region extends down from (approximately) level blog2 uc .and thus has approximately dlog(n/u)e
levels. Since we assume that clients previously cached unchanged vertices leading to members of W , we expect that clients’ searches will terminate near to the top of this region for most of the w − c paths that do
not lead to modified leaves. However, the approximately cdlog2 (n/u)e vertices along the c paths to leaves
that are both watched and updated will be obtained by clients.
Thus we expect that approximately (2w − 1) + wblog2 (u/w)c + cdlog2 (n/u)e nodes that will require
updating. In practice, the shift from one section to the next may not occur exactly at the same level on
every path, but these small variations do not significantly not change our estimates.

4.3

Case 2: u ≤ w

As with Case 1, we anticipate that most of the 2u − 1 vertices in the upper region will be ancestors to both
watched and updated leaves, and thus will be obtained by clients.
Similarly, we anticipate that while most vertices in the middle region (with a lower edge containing
w vertices) will be watched, only u paths will continue through to the bottom of this section of height
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Figure 3: Illustration depicting our analysis of the number of nodes that need to be updated when the
number of watched data entries is smaller than the number of updated data entries
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Figure 4: Illustration depicting our analysis of the number of nodes that need to be updated when the
number of watched data entries is greater than the number of updated data entries
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blog2 w/uc towards updated leaves, and that the other w − u paths will terminate near its upper boundary.
Thus, approximately bu log2 w/uc of its vertices will be updated and therefore obtained by clients.
Thus w paths through the lower region will be watched. However, only c of them will lead to leaves in
U and thus we expect that approximately cblog2 n/wc vertices in this region will be obtained by clients.
Finally using the same arguments, approximately (2u − 1) + wblog2 (w/u)c + cdlog2 (n/w)e vertices will
be obtained by clients. They approach approach the same value for the case w = u, which also corresponds
to the situation where the middle term of both expressions becomes 0.
As stated above, the expected number of nodes a skiplist based dictionary would need to update is
2 log2 n, for the case c = u = w = 1. For this case, our expression reduces to 1 + log2 (n). Once again, we see
Fern achieves a significant advantage when one observes the constants within the asymptotic expressions.

4.4

Tightening The Bounds

When a leaf in a Merkle trie has its contents updated, its hash value is changed. This change propagates to
all the ancestors of this leaf causing their hash values to change. Suppose a dictionary, that is stored in the
leaves of a Merkle trie, contains n entries, of which u are updated. Suppose a user is watching c entries that
are changed and w entries that are not changed. Let r be the number of refreshes that are caused by these
updates. Assume that all entries of the trie are generated randomly and independently and that all updates
and watched entries are generated randomly and independently among the entries of the trie. How does the
number of expected nodes that need to be refreshed E(r) increase as the number of updated nodes grows?
We analyze this problem assuming no path compression in the trie other than compression at the leaves.
We believe compression would not change the analysis assuming n is much larger than u.
Let’s first look at the case c = 0 and w = 1. We show that the expected number of nodes, that need to
be refreshed grows as Θ(lg(u)) within a tight set of bounds.
The expected number of refreshes E(r) corresponds to the longest common prefix between the hash of the
watched entry and the hash of an updated P
entry. Let Xi be a random variable that is 0 if the longest common
∞
prefix is < i and 1 if it is ≥
i.
Then,
X
=
variable equal to the longest common prefix.
P∞
P∞ i=1 Xi is aPrandom
∞
We have that E(X) = E( i=1 Xi ) = i=1 E(Xi ) = i=1 P (Xi ). We also have P (Xi ) = 1 − (1 − 1/2i )u .
While an exactPsolution to the summation
we offer
tight approximation.
Plg useems daunting,
Plg ua reasonably lg
Plg u
∞
i u
i u
u u
Lower bound.
1
−
(1
−
1/2
)
≥
1
−
(1
−
1/2
)
≥
1
−
(1
−
1/2
) = i=1 1 − (1 −
i=1
i=1
i=1
Plg u
1/u)u /leq i=1 1 − 1/e = (1 − 1/e) lg u.
P∞
P∞ Plg u
P∞ Plg u
Upper bound. i=1 1 − (1 − 1/2i )u = i=0 j=1 1 − (1 − 1/2i lg u+j )u = i=0 j=1 1 − (1 − 1/(ui 2j ))u ≤
P∞ Plg u
P∞
P∞
P∞
i+1 u
)) = lg u i=0 1−(1−1/(ui+1 ))u ≤ lg u i=0 1−(1−u/(ui+1 )) = lg u i=0 1/ui =
i=0
j=1 1−(1−1/(u
1
) lg u.
(1 + u−1
1
So we now have (1 − 1/e) lg u ≤ E(r) ≤ (1 − u−1
) lg u. Although we don’t have a formal proof, some
further investigation leads us to believe that E(r) ∈ lg u ± o(lg u).
Now, consider the case c = 0, w ≥ 1 and u > w. We provide an informal argument that the expected
number of refreshes should be Θ(w lg(u/w)). The argument is still informal in that it requires u >> w in a
way that depends on the hidden constant in the asymptotic notation and that we didn’t spell out explicitly.
What we try to prove corresponds to the previous result when w = 1. The argument works by induction
on w. Assume we have w − 1 watched. The expected number of refreshes is rold + rnew − rcommon , where
rold = the number of refreshes generated by the w − 1 values, rnew = number of refreshes generated by the
new value and rcommon = the number of refreshes that are common.
Let R(w, u) be the number of refreshes required when u updates are made and w words are watched
We want to show E(R(w, u)) ≤ aw lg(u/w) for some constant a. E(R(w, u)) ≤ E(R(w − 1, u)) + lg u. By
induction hypothesis, this is
a(w − 1) lg(u/(w − 1)) + lg u
= aw lg(u/w) + aw lg(w/(w − 1)) − a lg(u/(w − 1)) + lg(u)
= aw lg(u/w) + lg(waw /((w − 1)a(w−1) ua−1 )).
So, when a is a reasonably large constant and u is reasonably larger than w,
u ≥ (w/(w − 1))a(w−1)/(a−1) wa/(a−1) and we have E(R(w, u)) ≤ aw lg(u/w).
When c > 0, we need to add the whole refresh path for the changed values minus those from that path
that were already refreshed. It comes out to w lg(u/w) + c(lg n − lg w).
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Figure 5: Average Depth of Refresh Queries. As predicted by the analytical model, refresh queries tend to
terminate around depths log2 u = 7 and log n = 11.
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Figure 6: In-vivo experiment upon Planetlab.
Figure 5 provides empirical evidence supporting our analytical model of refresh queries. In this experiment, k = 2058, w = 37, u = 130. Reference patterns correspond to pairs of systems authenticating each
other in order to maintain routing tables for a Kademlia[13] DHT. Plots indicate the average number of Fern
vertices obtained for clients who obtained c = 8 updated nodes during this experiment. In these experiments,
the average number of vertices obtained by clients is 154. Our analytical approximation prediction (Case 1)
is 146. Surprisingly, this observed average number of refreshed vertices is within 2% of the modeled value.4
We have begun evaluation of Fern upon the Planetlab[1] global distributed testbed. Figure 6 was generated in an experiment with approximately 700 hosts, each monitoring approximately sixty mappings chosen
with distributions that mimic routing tables in a Kademlia[13] distributed hash table. Each time the dictionary was updated, two hundred randomly selected mappings were changed. Each plot depicts the fraction
of mappings obtained by each host. The vertical axis represents latency in seconds, the horizontal axis
represents the fraction of systems.

5

Synopsis

Fern is an updatable cryptographically authenticated dictionary. Unlike conventional approaches that require
provisioning of proxies that maintain full duplicates of the dictionary structure at untrusted proxies, Fern
utilizes an scalable and locality-aware autonomic content distribution network that incrementally distributes
portions of the dictionary as required by clients.
Fern’s use of an autonomic CDN makes it suitable for dynamic and Peer-to-Peer environments where
dedicated resources may not be available. Furthermore, Fern can also be used to fortify the same CDN on
which it relies against disruption from unauthorized systems.
A range of tree structures have been proposed for implementing updatable dictionary structures. While
most of these algorithms have similar asymptotic behavior, the number of vertices that must be transferred
to a client incrementally looking up a mapping stored within authenticated dictionary structures varies
dramatically. Since the communication latency related to transferring nodes to clients will dominate the
4 We have not yet performed a sensitivity study on this result, but this will be complete prior to the author notification date
and included in the final version of this paper.
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latency of client operations, these constants do matter. Our experiments indicate that Fern’s randomized
trie requires that substantially fewer vertices be transferred to clients than skiplists, and a comparable
number with more complicated self-balancing trees.
Furthermore clients may need to monitor the stability of mappings (not) stored within an authenticated
dictionary. Since Fern achieves an approximately balanced structure without rebalancing, clients can efficiently utilize caching of previously obtained vertices, thus minimizing the number of vertices that must be
transferred when a dictionary update is distributed.
Initial experiments conducted upon the Planetlab[1] global distributed testbed indicate that the CoralCDN provides similar performance to a large number of clients who have a limited bandwidth to a Fern
originator. In addition, our analysis of the number of vertices that must be transferred to a client monitoring
a set of mappings stored within a Fern trie approximates observed operation.
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